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The Beans of Wrath: Genetic Patent Holders Reap Further Protection
Monsanto Co. v. BowmanI
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of transgenic agriculture has brought with it a dispute
over the profits from lucrative genetic sequences. Breeders of genetically
modified organisms have seen their patent rights upheld not only for the
organisms they provide to farmers, but also for the specific genetic
sequences that those organisms' offspring include. For those farmers in
agreements with plant-breeding firms, the increased scope of this patent
protection has come at the expense of the agricultural practice of saving
seeds. As patent-protected genetic sequences integrate with the
surrounding physical environment, reliance on patent-protected products
increases. Despite qualms over this agglomeration of power, neither
Congress nor the courts have identified a limit to corporate control over
agroindustrial processes.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Monsanto Company and Monsanto Technology, LLC
("Monsanto") produces genetically-modified seeds for soybean growers.
Monsanto's product features patented herbicide-tolerant genes that allow
soybean growers to make liberal use of the glyphosate-based herbicide
Roundup, another Monsanto product.2 Farmers who buy these seeds sign
an agreement to use the seeds for a single growing season, to keep the
' 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011).





seeds for themselves, and to not save any of the subsequent crop for
replanting, research, or seed production.3 The license agreement cites
Monsanto's patents for self-replicating plant genes.4
There is an exception to the prohibition on the resale of these
seeds. Monsanto has expressly authorized the sale of its seeds to grain
elevators as commodity seeds.5 Commodity seeds are an undifferentiated
mixture of herbicide-tolerant seeds and other varieties, and are commonly
used as livestock feed.6 After Monsanto sued Indiana farmer Vernon
Bowman for infringement of its Roundup-Ready seed patent, the
corporation conceded the license, which prohibits the resale of its
herbicide-tolerant seeds, does not cover their sale as a commodity to grain
elevators.7
The defendant Bowman used Monsanto seeds for his first crop
between 1999-2007." Bowman supplemented his first crop each year with
a late-season planting, also known as a "second-crop." 9 Because a second
crop is less likely to be lucrative, Bowman opted not to plant costly
Monsanto seeds for this phase, instead using cheaper commodity seeds
purchased from Huey Soil Service, a local grain elevator.' 0 Bowman then
used glyphosate-based herbicide on his second crop plantings and
observed that these soybeans were herbicide-tolerant. Although Bowman
did not save the seeds from his first crop, he gathered the progeny of the
second-crop plantings for reuse the following year.
Monsanto sued Bowman in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, alleging Bowman's reuse of his second-crop
3 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
4 Id., U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993); U.S. Patent No. 5,633,435 (filed
Sept. 13, 1994).
5 Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345.
6 id.
7 Id., Oral Argument at 19:34, Id., (No. 1068) available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/all/bowman.html.
8 Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345.
Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
'
0 Id. at 1345.
"Id. at 1346.
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seeds was a violation of its patent rights as expressed in its license issued
to Bowman.12 Bowman countered that he purchased the second-crop
seeds from Huey Soil Service, and they were not subject to the agreement
with Monsanto, which forbade second-generation use.13 Bowman also
cautioned that an interpretation of Monsanto's patent that allowed it to
retain control over self-replicating products would undermine the
exhaustion doctrine, which holds method patents are exhausted upon sale
of the good that embodies the method.14
Monsanto insisted its rights to the genetic patent did not terminate
when those seeds reached the grain elevator and were combined with the
rest of the undifferentiated commodity seed.15 The license agreement
required that their seeds were not to be replanted for second-generation
use, regardless of any stint in a grain elevator.'6 Monsanto cited the Plant
Variety Protection Act, and argued if they were not allowed to retain
ownership over their patented genetic sequences through subsequent
generations of seeds, then agricultural innovators would lose the benefits
of their patent rights.' 7
Monsanto sought legal damages for Bowman's plantings datin
back to 1999, when Bowman had first replanted his commodity seeds.
Bowman alleged he did not receive notice of Monsanto's claim until the
action was commenced.' 9 Monsanto produced a letter it had sent to
Bowman in 1999 that contained an allegation of patent infringement.20
The Federal Circuit cited cases where the replanting of seeds
without Monsanto's permission was held to be unauthorized, even where
12 d
14 d
15 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
1 7Id. at 1347 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq. (2006)).
18 Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1345.
19d. at 1348.
20 Id. at 1349.
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the planter had never signed an agreement with Monsanto.21 The court
interpreted Bowman's license agreement to make no distinction between
the seeds that Bowman used in his first crop and those from his second
22crop: both crops were subject to the prohibition on replanting. That
Bowman had obtained his second-crop seeds from a grain elevator made
no difference; the herbicide-tolerant seeds remained within Monsanto's
control.23
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The U.S. Constitution allows for the patentability of "Writings and
Discoveries," with the purpose of enhancing the "useful arts."24 The
extent of what is considered patentable subject matter has been in flux
since the pre-industrial age when the charter was framed. Controversy has
centered on whether patent protection covers the useful device or the
useful process.25 Reluctance to grant expansive patent protection stems
from the constitutional purpose of advancing public knowledge and
"useful arts," as opposed to guaranteeing profits to intellectual
proprietors.26 Additionally, a longstanding doctrine forbade the granting
of patents for naturally occurring phenomena.27
21 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Monsanto Co.
v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328(Fed. Cir. 2006)).22 Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348.
23 Sherry Qualter "Big Win for Monsanto in Seed Patent Case," NAT'L L. J. (Sept. 26,
2011), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleFriendlyCC.jsp?id=1202516643031.
24 U.S. CONST., art I., § 8, cl. 8.
25 DONALD S. CHISUM, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 772-73 (2004).
26 See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945) ("The
primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the advancement
of the arts and sciences. Its inducement is directed to disclosure of advances in
knowledge which will be beneficial to society; it is not a certificate of merit, but an
incentive to disclosure.").
27 See generally Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 67 (1972); Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948);
O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112-121 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How.156 (1853).
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Congress modified this doctrine in 1930 with the Plant Patent
28Act. The Plant Patent Act created patent rights for one who "invents or
discovers" any asexually reproducing plants, marking the first time living
organisms received patent protection.29
Congress recognized plant protections again in 1970 when it
passed the Plant Variety Protection Act ("PVPA").30 The PVPA created
patent-like rights for breeders of sexually reproducing plants.31 Congress
enacted the PVPA in part to bring the United States into compliance with
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
("UPOV"), a pact between thirty-seven countries to recognize the rights of
plant breeders.32 The PVPA did not provide for the protection of specific
genetic sequences, it only required a general "uniqueness." 33
The PVPA also recognized three exemptions from the new
protections. First, Rrotected seeds could still be used by anyone for
research purposes. Second, farmers were permitted to save seeds under
PVPA protection for future plantings.35 And third, a mechanism was
created whereby the public interest in planting protected seeds could be
asserted in the face of monopolistic plant-breeder control.36
28 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006).
29 Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel
and Nonobvious Recontextualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REv. 303,
313 (Nov. 2002) ("Congress enacted the [Plant Patent Act] to ensure that plant breeders
were given adequate incentive, in the form of exclusive federal rights, to develop new
and useful varieties of plants without fear of other breeders taking and propagating the
new varieties, thereby undermining the initial breeder's intellectual and other investment.
However, Congress, presumably not wishing to extend exclusive rights to breeders whose
new varieties were not "inventions" within the meaning of the patent law, limited the
patent rights to those varieties created by asexual reproduction.").
30 7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq. (2006).
" 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2006).
32 Keith Aoki, Seeds ofDispute: Intellectual Property Rights and Agricultural
Biodiversity, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L. J.79, 98-99 (Fall 2009).
3 7 U.S.C. § 2402.
34 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2006).
3 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2006).
36 7 U.S,C. § 2404 (2006).
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A 1980 Supreme Court case supplemented the Plant Patent Act and
the PVPA. Diamond v. Chakrabarty expanded patentable subject matter
to include living organisms. Ananda Chakrabarty sought and received
patent protection for a strain of bacteria he had developed that was to be
used in cleaning up oil spills.3 8 The Court described the bacterial strain as
"a nonnaturally occurring manufacture of composition of matter-a
product of ingenuity." 39 Although previous cases 40 made clear that
biological discoveries were not patentable, the Court reversed course in
permitting Chakrabarty's patent. The Court supported its conclusion with
an opinion that courts ought not read limitations into the subject matter of
patentability. 41
Four dissenters argued Congress had reappraised the subject matter
of patent law when it passed the PVPA only ten years before. The
minority said if the democratically elected branch had wanted to recognize
intellectual property rights for new strains of bacteria, then it would have
done so when it had recognized those rights for plant breeders. 42 But the
majority ruled that thenceforth, U.S. law would allow patent protection for
biological entities to the extent that some "ingenuity" could be attached to
their existence.43 This patentability standard became assuredly
manageable with the advent of transgenic agriculture.44
But the PVPA's exemption for agricultural seed-saving still eroded
intellectual proprietorship over patented life.45 A plant breeder could
formalize a transaction for a unique, nonobvious organism, but because
sexual organisms can self-replicate, a patent-holder's rights would
diminish when farmers engage in the timeless practice of replanting seeds.
" 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
3 1 Id. at 309-10.
39 id.
40 See supra text accompanying note 25.
41JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW BASICS, § 6:1 (2011).
42 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980).
43 Id. at 313.
4 MARIE-MONIQUE ROBIN, THE WORLD ACCORDING TO MONSANTO, 204. "Once a
company has been able to isolate the gene and describe its function, it can get a patent"
( uoting John Doll, Biotechnology Department, U.S. Patent Office).
4 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2006).
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The Plant Patent Act offered an agrochemical firm no protection because
it only covered asexual organisms.46 In an attempt at loss prevention,
Monsanto purchased the rights to a transgenic seed technology that
prevents germination.47 Nicknamed by critics the "terminator seed," the
technology would theoretically prevent farmers from saving seeds because
the plants simply lacked the genetic capacity to produce seeds.48 In the
wake of a vociferous international outcry over the potential for widespread
crop die-off, Monsanto pledged not to commercialize the technology,4 9
retaining the patent only for research purposes.50
The case that erased the seed-saving exemption, and allowed
Monsanto to monetize its genetic arsenal, was J.E.M Ag Supply v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred Intern., Inc.5 1 In a dispute over soybean seeds, the Supreme
Court recognized the continuing patent protection of a plant breeder over
the interests of a reseller. The Court fused the strong proprietary
exclusions of the Patent Act with the more limited protections found in the
PVPA.52 Despite the PVPA's designation of patent rights only for
sexually reproducing plants, the Court did not find that that protection was
meant to be exclusive. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas
maintained that "denying patent protection... simply because such coverage
was thought technologically infeasible in 1930... would be inconsistent
with the forward-looking perspective of the utility patent statute." 3 After
J.E.M Ag, newly developed, sexually reproducing plant breeds enjoyed
46 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006).
47 Control of Plant Gene Expression, U.S. Patent No. 5723765 (filed June 7, 1995).
48 Jeremy P. Oczek, In the Aftermath of the 'Terminator Technology' Controversy:
Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically Engineered Seeds and the Right to Save
and Replant Seed, 41 B.C. L. REv 627, 628-29 (May 2000).
49 John Vidal, World Bracedfor Terminator 2, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 5 1999, 20:55
EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/1999/oct/06/gm.food2.
so Oczek, supra note 47, at 629-30.
s 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
52 Jim Chen, Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection Act in
Furtherance ofInnovation, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv 105, 124-26 (Nov. 2005).
13J.E.M Ag. Supply, 534 U.S. at 135.
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full patent protection, well beyond the partial protections of the PVPA,
which were always subject to the three exemptions.54
The Federal Circuit has applied the broad J.E.MAg protections in
the disputes between Monsanto and soybean farmers. Homan McFarling"
entered into Monsanto's Technology Agreement forbidding the replanting
of Monsanto's Roundup-Ready seeds, but then replanted them. McFarling
claimed Monsanto's Technology Agreement was an unenforceable
contract of adhesion.56 Secondly, McFarling attempted to revive the seed-
saving exemption in the PVPA, arguing the Technology Agreement's
prohibition on replanting violated the PVPA's seed-saving exemption."
Finally, McFarling argued the patent exhaustion doctrine should
allow farmers to replant Roundup-Ready seeds.5 8 The patent exhaustion
doctrine holds that a patent-holder gives up her rights when she sells the
good that embodies the patent, and thus relinquishes financial control.59
The Federal Circuit recognized the doctrine of patent exhaustion when "an
authorized unrestricted first sale by a patentee of his patented product
exhausts the patent rights to the particular product."60 In order for the
doctrine of patent exhaustion to apply to genetic soybean patents, a farmer
would have to distinguish between the seeds he planted and the genome
Monsanto controls. The question is whether the practice of farming in an
era of biogenetic patents is properly understood as a licensing of genetic
sequences or as a transfer of unique goods,in other words, whether patent-
54 Chen, supra note 51, at 125-26.
5 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (2002).
5 6 Id. at 1298.
5 Id at 1299.
58 id
59 See U.S. v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) ("The patentee may surrender
his monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or in part by the sale of an article
embodying the invention. His monopoly remains so long as he retains the ownership of
the patented article. But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee
may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article.
Hence the patentee cannot control the resale price of patented articles which he has
sold...by stipulating for price maintenance by his vendees.").
6 Jon Sievers, Not So Fast My Friend: What the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine Means to
the Seed Industry after Quanta v. LG Electronics, 14 DRAKE. J. AGluc. L 355, 365, citing
Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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protected genes can be understood as something other than the seeds that
embody them.6'
Despite a firm dissent from Judge Clevenger, the court ruled that
Monsanto's Technology Agreement was not an unenforceable contract of
adhesion. 62 Then the court applied JE.M Ag's patent protections for
sexually reproduced plants, ensuring Monsanto's patent was not subject to
the PVPA exemptions.63 Finally, the court declined to dissociate
Monsanto's patented genetic sequences from the seeds that contain those
sequences. 64 The court reasoned that the patent exhaustion doctrine does
not apply when McFarling only purchased the "use rights" of the seeds.65
This holding confirmed the rights of genetically modified plant breeders to
retain rights to their product's offspring. In a companion case, the court
said the Technology Agreement's liquid damages provision was punitive,
thus unenforceable, and that an appropriate penalty would be
compensation for Monsanto's actual damages.66
The next soybean case the Federal Circuit heard 67 further extended
Monsanto's patent rights. Monsanto sued Mississippi farmer Mitchell
61 See Demaine & Fellmath, supra note 28, at 314 ("A biological organism cannot be
divorced from its genes either ontologically or taxonomically; every organism is, in a
sense, defined by the phenotypes expressed by its genome. In other words, the physical
and basic behavioral contours of a life form are defined by the life form's genome, just as
the parameters of a culinary dish are defined by a recipe. If someone were to develop a
new and useful variety of rose and obtain a patent on that organism, the patent would not
cover all organisms of that "distinct" patented type, in the words of the [Plant Patent Act]
and PVPA.").
62 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1294-96 (2002).
63 Id. at 1299.
6 Id. at 1297-98.
61 Id. at 1298-99 ("the restrictions in the Technology Agreement are within the scope of
the patent grant, for the patents cover the seeds as well as the plants. The.. .doctrine of
exhaustion of the patent right is not implicated, as the new seeds grown from the original
batch had never been sold. The price paid by the purchaser 'reflects only the value of the
'use' rights conferred by the patentee."' (quoting B. Braun Medical Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
124 F. 3d 1419, 1426, 43 USPQ2d. 1896, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1997))).
66 The Technology Agreement's liquid damages clause provided that in the instance of
patent infringement, a farmer would be required to pay 120 times the amount of
Monsanto's actual damages. McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1340.
67 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (2006).
434
BEANS OF WRATH
Scruggs, who had bought and planted Monsanto's protected soybean seeds
but never signed their licensing agreement. Scruggs argued he could not
be bound to an agreement that he did not sign, and that unlike McFarling,
the PVPA's seed-saving exemption would protect his activity. But, the
Federal Circuit again sided with Monsanto, characterizing Scruggs'
obligation to Monsanto as a "royalty fee," despite never having entered
into a contract with them.69
Additionally, both McFarling and Scruggs advanced antitrust
arguments that the court rejected. McFarling argued Monsanto had
abused the patent system in an anticompetitive manner through a "tying
arrangement," which eliminated the distinction between the patented
genetic sequences and the seeds themselves.70 McFarling argued that
because he could not buy seeds without assuming unlawful control over
Monsanto's patented genes, the legal recognition of seeds-genes unity was
an anticompetitive tying arrangement, and he should be able to replant
seeds without disturbing Monsanto's patent rights.7 1 The court did not
recognize the genetic sequence/seed distinction and chose to favor patent
law's broad purpose of "incentive to innovate." 72
Scruggs argued Monsanto's control over the herbicide glyphosate
constituted an anticompetitive and unlawful control over the market. 73
The "tying arrangement" that Scruggs identified was between the seeds'
herbicide-tolerant genetic sequences and the herbicide itself.74 The
Environmental Protection Agency's regulations had restricted generic
herbicides, leaving Scruggs and other farmers with only Monsanto's
68 Id. at 1333.
69 Id. at 1340.
70 id
71 Id at 1342 ("McFarling effectively argues in different words that he should be granted
a compulsory license to use the patent rights in conjunction with the second-generation
ROUNDUP READY@ soybeans in his possession after harvest. We decline to hold that
Monsanto's raw exercise of its right to exclude from the patented invention by itself is a
"tying" arrangement that exceeds the scope of the patent grant.").
72 Id ("In this instance, the anticompetitive effect of which McFarling complains is part
and parcel of the patent system's role in creating incentives for potential inventors.")
73 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1339-41 (2006).
74 Id. at 1340.
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product. This argument persuaded the dissenting Judge Dyk," but did not
move the majority.
The J.E.M Ag doctrine of protecting genetic patents for soybean
products has not had as much success in foreign jurisdictions. The
European Union's Biopatent Directive stresses preservation of
environmental resources, and exhibits reluctance towards the awarding of
patent rights to valuable genetic material.76 In a soybean case, a European
judge implemented the Biopatent Directive and denied the patentability of
genetic sequences when those sequences' "function" was not defined.77 A
UK judge held Monsanto had not defined "isolated genetic sequence"
adequately enough to earn soybean patent protection. The European
Union's underdeveloped federalist structure is part of what made these
opinions possible: the European Patent Office is not recognized by the law
of the European Union.
7 Id. at 1342-44.
76 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on
the Legal Protection ofBiotechnological Inventions, at 10, 13, 14 ("Whereas regard
should be had to the potential of biotechnology for the environment and in particular the
utility of this technology for the development of methods of cultivation which are less
polluting and more economical in their use of ground; whereas the patent system should
be used to encourage research into, and the application of, such processes... whereas the
[European] Community's legal framework for the protection of biotechnological
inventions can be limited to laying down certain principles as they apply to the
patentability of biological material as such, such principles being intended in particular to
determine the difference between inventions and discoveries with regard to the
patentability of certain elements of human origin... whereas substantive patent law cannot
serve to replace or render superfluous national, European or international law which may
impose restrictions or prohibitions or which concerns the monitoring of research and of
the use or commercialization of its results, notably from the point of view of the
requirements of public health, safety, environmental protection, animal welfare, the
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Despite the reluctance of foreign courts to grant genetic patent
rights, McFarling and Scruggs appeared to indicate that plant breeders
could lawfully forbid seed-saving, whether or not farmers had signed a
Technology Agreement. 79 But, then the patent exhaustion doctrine was
later revived in a microchip case which held that a patentee exhausts his
patent rights once he has sold components that "substantially embody" the
patent.80 Quanta Computers prevailed against LG Electronics, who had
provided Quanta with microprocessors that Quanta then combined with
products from other sources and installed into computers for sale. 8 An
express provision in Quanta's contract with LG forbade the reselling of
LG's microchips in combination with other products. 82 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court did not allow LG to contract around the patent exhaustion
doctrine. The Court cited a rule that once a product is sold, the vendor
loses the ability to put restrictions on it.83
Quanta offered a new hope to Monsanto's licensees. The Court
ruled that a recombination of software could be resold despite an explicit
contractual prohibition from doing so.84 If this were true, then perhaps a
soybean farmer's debt to the genetic researchers at Monsanto could be
severed. If the Federal Circuit could recognize that a soybean farmer was
more like a buyer than a "licensee," then Monsanto's patent rights could
be considered exhausted after the sale. The laboring yeoman could
perhaps again "scrape a living out of this dirt."8 6
7 See Sievers, supra note 59, at 363-365.
80 Quanta v. LG Elec. 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2009).
8 Id. at 623-25.82 Id. at 623.
83 Id. at 626; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Company, 243
US 502 (1917).
8 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 636.
85 Courts have distinguished the patent restrictions that can be imposed on licensees,
which have historically been broader than those on buyers. See Sievers, supra note 59, at
366-71.
86 The quoted material is Scruggs' description of the activity that the Federal Circuit ruled
as piracy. Adam Liptak, Saving Seeds Subjects Farmers to Suits Over Patent, N. Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/us/saving-seeds-
subjects-farmers-to-suits-over-patent.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Federal Circuit ruled on a patent infringement claim by the
seed-purveyor Monsanto against an Indiana soybean farmer. It was not
clear whether the terms of their agreement would apply to all of the
defendant Vernon Bowman's plantings. 87 Although Bowman signed the
Technology Agreement pledging not to replant the plaintiff Monsanto's
seeds, the defendant argued that the seeds he purchased from a grain
elevator should not fall under the agreement he signed with Monsanto.
Because the seeds Bowman purchased from the grain elevator were
presented as an undifferentiated commodity, he argued the court should
distinguish between the grain elevator seeds and the seeds purchased
directly from Pioneer Hi-Bred, a licensed seller of Monsanto's seeds. 89
Specifically, Bowman argued the doctrine of patent exhaustion
applied to the second-generation seeds obtained from the grain elevator.90
Since neither Monsanto nor its licensed sellers were involved in the sale of
the grain elevator seeds, the defendant argued Monsanto could not claim
patent infringement when the seeds changed hands.91 Monsanto
responded by arguing that regardless of the seeds' provenance, the
Technology Agreement prohibited the replanting without Monsanto's
permission of seeds that exhibit glyphosate-resistance. 92 The corporation
indicated the losses it was certain to face if its patent rights were not
extended to later generations of seeds.9 3
As it had in McFarling and Scruggs, the court did not apply the
patent exhaustion doctrine to the planting of seeds without Monsanto's
authorization. After considering the notion that Monsanto did not have
patent rights to the undifferentiated commodity seeds, the court




92 Id. at 1347.
9 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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nonetheless held Bowman liable for patent infringement. 94 "Even if
Monsanto's patent rights in the commodity seeds are exhausted, such a
conclusion would be of no consequence because once a grower, like
Bowman, plants the commodity seeds containing Monsanto's Roundup-
Ready technology, and the next generation of seed develops, the grower
has created a newly infringing article." 95
Bowman criticized the ruling that second-generation uses of seeds
were covered by the same agreement that pertained to the first planting. 96
Citing Quanta v. LG Electronics,9 7 Bowman argued that because a seed
"substantially embodies" future generations of seeds, Monsanto would be
permitted to retain patent rights to unlimited generations of glyphosate-
tolerant seeds. 98 Bowman's invocation of the Quanta holding was meant
to persuade the court that once the items that embody a patent are
transferred commercially, the owner of their patent rights voluntarily gives
them up, and the doctrine of patent exhaustion applies. But, the court did
not apply the holding in Quanta, a microchip case, to its recent genetic
soybean jurisprudence. 99
The next question was whether the defendant had received
sufficient notice of Monsanto's allegation of patent infringement.
Bowman argued Monsanto's assertion of constructive notice was not
valid.' 00 Because Monsanto did not mark, or require its dealers to mark,
the pesticide-tolerant soybean seeds, Bowman was not made aware that
his planting of seeds from the grain elevator made him liable for patent
infringement.' 0 Monsanto said Bowman waived this argument when he
failed to raise it at the trial level, despite his status as a pro se litigant.102
The appellate court held Bowman sufficiently raised the notice argument
by pointing out at trial that Monsanto did not prevent their seeds from
94 Id at 1348.
9 Id.
9 Id. at 1346.
97 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
98 Bowman 657 F.3d at 1346, 1348.
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mixing with other seeds at the grain elevator.103 At trial, Bowman
suggested Monsanto could have included provisions in their licensing
agreements requiring farmers to sell Monsanto products only to pre-
approved dealers, thus ensuring a segregation of patented and non-
patented seeds.104 Monsanto countered that its agreements do require
farmers to mark their first-generation patented seeds. 0 5 The court
nonetheless held that Bowman had not waived the constructive notice
issue at trial level.106
However, Monsanto prevailed on the issue of actual notice, so the
court's holding on the constructive notice issue was not dispositive. 0 7
The 1999 letter that the corporation sent to the farmer warned him of
patent infringement and put Bowman on notice of the dispute.los The
letter identified the subject matter of the charged patent infringement:
soybean seeds. It included a reiteration of the Technology Agreement
that Bowman had signed. The letter also reminded Bowman that any
unauthorized planting of patented seeds would result in a patent
infringement, and that no post hoc fee could be paid to remedy that
infringement. 110
The court held that this communiqu6 delivered through the mail
had the effect of putting Bowman on notice of his patent infringement,
103 Id. at 1348-49.
0 Id.
105 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011).1 06 Id. at 1348-49.
0 7 Id. at 1349.
1os Id.









110 Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1349.
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despite the fact that the letter made no mention of commodity seeds."'
No distinction between seeds purchased from Monsanto and
undifferentiated commodity seeds from a grain elevator was recognized by
the court, and it held Bowman had received actual notice of his patent
violation. 12
V. COMMENT
Monsanto's swelling patent rights have incurred criticism of the
ethics of genetic patent-holders. A "farmers' rights" movement has
emerged internationally, with the goal of protecting those who subsist on
agriculture1 l3 from the intellectual proprietors who could sue them as
patent infringers.'1 4 Via Campesina 1 5 is an international network that has
emerged as a leading proponent of "food sovereignty," a policy
framework that seeks agrarian reform, democratic control of agriculture,
and retention of genetic resourcesll 6 from encroaching agroindustrial
1 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
112 d
13 RAJSHREE CHANDRA, KNOWLEDGE AS PROPERTY: ISSUES IN THE MORAL GROUNDING
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 241-42 (2010) ("biotechnology led innovations in
plant varieties and animals did not happen spontaneously. It used, as a base, the
knowledge of seeds and breeds and plant properties, generated, shared, and exchanged
over thousands of years. Farmers, in most developing countries, have been the main
actors involved in saving seeds, cross-breeding to produce new varieties with better
suited traits... farmers never had any defined rights over their knowledge, or the genetic
resources that they held. Commercial breeding, fuelled by biotechnological innovations
in agriculture, transformed these farmers from owners of their gene pool to donors, who
then received the commercially bred plant varieties and their seeds for a fee.. .there is a
need to devise and institute fair and equitable benefit-sharing mechanisms which would
make farmers partners in biotechnological developments in agriculture.").
114 CHANDRA, supra note 113, at 268 ("The farmer continues to remain located outside
the legal framework which has apparently been instituted for him.").
115 Via Campesina's Food Sovereignty Principles, available at
http://danedocs.countyofdane.com/webdocs/PDF/foodCouncil/foodSovereigntyPrinciples
.pdf.
116 CHANDRA, supra note 113, at 248-49 ("Traditionally, because seeds were freely
reproducible, they defied the necessary criteria of property which are excludability and
divisibility. A naturally propagating species was not amenable to be apportioned in the
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research firms." 7 Some have followed this argument far enough to label
Monsanto the world's leading "biopirate.""
American law has remained steadfast in favoring the patent rights
of agroindustry. States have passed statutes" 9 penalizing the knowing
destruction of farmers' fields, but a Missouri court would not likely hold a
genetic patent-holder like Monsanto liable for reducing biodiversity.120
A soybean farmer haled into court for patent infringement would
do better to note the anticompetitive outcomes that have attended the
broadening rights of genetic patent holders. The PVPA was passed to
further crop innovation and increase yields, in keeping with the
Constitution's "promotion of the useful Arts," although it is not clear that
this goal has been reached.12 1 Instead, the principal beneficiaries of this
new doctrine have been the proprietors who conjure specific genetic
sequences and patent them.12 2 While patent law has historically denied
proprietary protection to mere discoveries, the recent rulings expanding
genetic patents have drastically changed agricultural practice in a short
period. 2 1
same way that a non-biological object was.. .described as 'embodiment of life's
continuity and renewability,' the seed has been not only stated to be the source of history
but also importabtly, the ultimate symbol of food security. The free exchange of seed
among farmers has long been considered to be the very basis of maintenance of
biodiversity as well as food security... any attempt to alter management and control of
seeds will therefore necessarily impinge upon the livelihood and access rights of
farmers.").
117 See generally Steve Suppan, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs: Challenges for Food
Sovereignty, 32 WTR FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 111 (Winter 2008).
118 Bioprospecting, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
http://www.icta.org/global-warming-and-the-environment/bioprospecting/ (2004).
"9 See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.353 (2006).
120 See generally In Re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation, 666 F.Supp.2d 1004 (2009).
121 See Chen, supra note 51, at 155.
122 id
123 Charles Benbrook, Genetically Engineered Crops and Pesticide Use in the United
States: The First Nine Years, AG BIOTECH INFONET 6-7 (Oct. 2004) ("Reliance on a
single herbicide, glyphosate, as the primary method for managing weeds on millions of
acres... has led to the need to apply more herbicides per acre to achieve the same level of
weed control.") Id. at 3.
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Soybean jurisprudence since JE.M Ag has strengthened the patent
protections of Monsanto. Since plant breeders have enjoyed strong patent
protection after that case, Monsanto has been able to prevent farmers from
saving seeds, thus guaranteeing a fresh license fee for Monsanto before
each planting season.
The combination of McFarling, Scruggs, and Bowman leaves little
room for the ownership of soybean growers over their wares. McFarling
was not able to invoke the PVPA's seed-saving exemption after JE.M
Ag. Scruggs never signed Monsanto's licensing agreement but was still
subject to their license fees. After Scruggs, contractual privity with
Monsanto is not required in order for a farmer to be liable for infringement
of their soybean patent. And while Bowman had a Monsanto contract, the
disputed seeds came from a grain elevator and not a Monsanto-licensed
retailer. After Bowman, there may be no finger left in the dike preventing
total corporate ownership of America's soybean stock, with farmers
relegated to a role of "licensing" genetic material.
Judge Clevenger's dissent in the McFarling case attacked
Monsanto's omnipotence by focusing on the forum selection clause in
their contracts with soybean growers.124 Clevenger pointed out that at
least sixty-six percent of the country's soybean acreage is planted with
Monsanto's product.125 But the line of contract cases since Carnival
Cruise v. Shutel26 has permitted the inequality of bargaining power
evinced by forum selection clauses. Clevenger called Monsanto's lure an
unenforceable contract of adhesion.' 27 The Technology Agreement
included what could be termed an offensive forum selection clause,
124 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1300 (8th Cir. 2003) (Clevenger, J.,
dissenting).
125 Id. at 1301 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). In Bowman's home state of Indiana, 94 percent
of soybean cropland is planted with glyphosate-resistant product. Monsanto Co. v.
Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
126 499 US 585 (1991).
127 Former Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman would agree with Judge Clevenger. In
an interview, Glickman said that "contracts with farmers need to be fair and not result in
a system that reduces farmers to mere serfs on the land or create an atmosphere of
mistrust among farmers or between farmers and companies." See ROBIN, supra note 43,
at 201.
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binding a farmer to appear in a St. Louis court for any future patent
infringement suits brought by Monsanto.128
Clevenger's dissent in the McFarling case focuses on Monsanto's
use of a contract of adhesion; 129 but he does not point out that the Federal
Circuit itself has played a large role in strengthening patent protection.
Founded in part to avoid forum-shopping, and the jurisprudential
hodgepodge that results from that practice, the Federal Circuit has unified
the rights of proprietors and served as a reliable bulwark against
infringers. Since its 1982 founding, the Federal Circuit has exhibited a
pro-proprietor streak in patent infringement cases.13 0
The Bowman court's holding on the notice issue also puts farmers
in a difficult position. The defendant was liable for planting seeds he
purchased from Huey Soil Service, a grain elevator with no official ties to
Monsanto. The detection of Monsanto's genetic sequences in the grain
elevator seeds meant that Bowman's planting was a patent infringement.
Monsanto su ported this conclusion by proffering its 1999 cease-and-
desist letter. However, the letter did not indicate any and all seeds that
Bowman planted were automatic patent infringements. The Federal
Circuit even acknowledged that the letter contained no mention of
commodity seeds or of the commercial provenance of the seeds.' 32 Still,
the court said Bowman received actual notice that Monsanto patents
covered the seeds bought from a grain elevator.
The Bowman court's finding of actual notice is troubling when
considered in conjunction with the nature of self-replicating organisms.
Patent protection for computer hardware, as in Quanta, covers inanimate
microchips, capable of reorganization only by human hands, but the same
128 McFarling,-302 F.3d at 1303 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 1300.
130 See CHISUM, supra note 24, at 26 n. 104, (quoting Donald R. Drummer, et al., A
Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent Law Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED.
CIRCUr B. J. 151, 154 (1995), ("the most notable trend.. .is that, in district court cases,
the Federal Circuit was significantly more likely to affirm judgments in favor of patent
owners than accused infringers.")).
131 Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
132 Id. at 1349.
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cannot be said for soybean crops. Genetic material cannot be contained by
technology agreements, especially when that material is put in the ground
and left to grow. Genetic drift133 inevitably scatters the sequences that
form the subject of Monsanto's patent to surrounding bean fields, and
eventually into grain elevators. It is not reasonable to expect soybean
farmers to eradicate traces of glyphosate-resistance from their fields.
The Bowman case also may totally eliminate farmers' ability to
save seeds. The Federal Circuit tersely reiterated the end of the PVPA's
exemption on seed saving, as first announced in McFarling and Scruggs,
by illustrating the difference between the "right to make" and the "right to
use a patented article."' 34 The court said if the use of a commodity seed
for planting is natural and foreseeable, then the "right to make" and "right
to use" distinction should not apply, and Monsanto's patent rights do not
extend to their seeds' progeny.' 35 But, the court apparently considered
that commodity seeds' natural and foreseeable use is not for planting but
as feed for livestock.136 This interpretation forecloses a potential non-
Monsanto source of soybean seeds, further strengthening the corporation's
market share.
The seed-saving exemption to plant breeders' protection under the
PVPA was read out of the statute by Justice Thomas' in Jem Ag
Supply. But the public interest exemptionl39 in the PVPA still has the
force of law. The statute describes an instance where the Secretary of
1 Joanna Masel, Genetic Drift, CURRENT BIOLOGY, Vol. 21 Issue 20 (Oct. 21, 2011),
R837-38, available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982211008827.134Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348, (quoting Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264
F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("The right to use 'do[es] not include the right to construct an
essentially new article on the template of the original, for the right to make the article
remains with the patentee."')).
135Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348.
16id.
137A Monsanto employee from 1977-78. ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE
THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 169-75 (2001).
138 J.E.M Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124, 143 (combining utility patents
and PVPA protection to eliminate PVPA's seed-saving exemption).
139 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2006).
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Agriculture may determine that a plant breeder's protection may be taken
away "in order to insure an adequate supply of fiber, food[,] or feed in this
country and that the owner is unwilling or unable to supply the public
needs for the variety at a price which may reasonably be deemed fair." 40
The PVPA's public interest exemption has never been argued. 14 ' The
exemption foresees a future scarcity, made worse by useful plant varieties
tied up by undercapitalized intellectual proprietors. Although arguments
that genetic monoculture could diminish the public interest could find their
way to a courtroom, it is hard to imagine the invocation of this public
interest exemption against Monsanto. Monsanto's dominion over soybean
crops increases with each harvest, but it is unclear that they would not be
able to provide foodstuff to America at a less than reasonable price if a
scarcity were to occur.
Unlike McFarling and Scruggs, Bowman's argument did not
appeal to the Sherman Antitrust Act.142 An examination of Monsanto's
broad patent protection and unassailable position in the soybean market
would have revealed that the antimonopoly law should apply.143
McFarling argued Monsanto's practice has been anticompetitive with a
resulting public interest detriment.14 4 Monsanto's offer of glyphosate-
140 d
141 Chen, supra note 51, at 124-25. ("The PVPA's public interest provision represents
merely a single instance in which the United States has consciously limited the reach of
its intellectual property laws in order to advance competing public interests. James
Madison and Alexander Hamilton favored a system of prizes and awards over the
copyright and patent system that the Constitution eventually adopted. Madison and
Hamilton's counterparts elected copyrights and patents as a fiscally conservative
alternative to direct subsidies from what was then a thin and precarious federal treasury.
Although intellectual property eventually prevailed as the United States' principal tool
for motivating innovation, exceptions to the proprietary model abound throughout
American law. To my knowledge, however, the PVPA's "public interest" provision has
never been invoked.")
142 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2006).
143 See FRANGOIs LtvtQuE & HOWARD SHELANSKI, ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 85, 86-88 (2005) ("As firms with substantial
patent portfolios become more aggressive in asserting their [intellectual property] rights,
it has been natural to pose the question of whether, and if so under what conditions, the
antitrust laws might be violated through the leveraging of market power.").
144 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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tolerant soybean seeds carries with it the requirement to buy glyphosate,
an herbicide that is also under Monsanto's patent protection. McFarling
alleged that Monsanto's Technology Agreement creates an illegal "tying
arrangement," wherein the patent protection over a soybean's genetic code
is inseparable from the seed itself.145 McFarling further asserted that
Monsanto's patent was anticompetitive, because a farmer cannot obtain
seeds without necessarily obtaining the patented genetic sequences that the
seeds contain. 146 The Department of Justice has recognized the problem
of illegal tying arrangements in its antitrust guidelines.147 "Package
licensing-the licensing of multiple items of intellectual property in a
single license or in a group of related licenses-may be a form of tying
arrangement if the licensing of one product is conditioned upon the
acceptance of a license of another, separate product."' 48 But, the
McFarling court did not recognize a tying arrangement between the
patent-protected genome and the soybean seeds themselves.
The antitrust argument in Scruggs identified a different potential
tying arrangement. Monsanto owns patents on both the glyphosate-
resistant seeds and the glyphosate itself. Monsanto's soybean regime
requires a soybean farmer to buy Monsanto-controlled herbicide in order
to farm its genetic obverse, the Monsanto-controlled soybean. In Scruggs,
the dissenting Judge Dyk noted that Monsanto's licensing agreement
contained a provision requiring soybean-licensees to spray only
Monsanto's Roundup.14 9 The Scruggs majority did not find this improper
because Roundup was the only glyphosate product not banned by the
Environmental Protection Agency at that time.15 0 Nevertheless, because
the acquisition of one patent-protected product (seeds) is tied to the
145 Tempe Smith, Going to Seed?: Using Monsanto as a Case Study to Examine the
Patent and Antitrust Implications of the Sale and Use of Genetically Modified Seeds, 61
ALA. L. REv. 629, 641-46 (2010).
146 McFarling, at 1297-99.
147 Harvey I. Saferstein, Licensing and the Antitrust Laws 899 PLI/PAT 913, 922-23
(2007).
148 Id. at 958.
149 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Dyk, J., dissenting).
soId, at 1342.
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contractually required acquisition of another (herbicide), Monsanto's
strategy is an antitrust violation.' 5 '
Strengthening the argument that Monsanto's Technology
Agreement represents an antitrust violation is an analysis of Monsanto's
strong market position, due in large part to its twin patents on glyphosate
and glyphosate-tolerant soybeans.' 52 Thirty percent of Monsanto's $7.3
billion revenue in 2006 came from sales of glyphosate.153 Judge
Clevenger wrote that "Monsanto's control of the market means that
farmers have no place else to turn for glyphosate-resistant seed."' 54
The link between soybean farming and Monsanto's herbicide
grows stronger as glyphosate-resistant weeds grow more entrenched in
soybean regions. The broad dependence on a single herbicide has
garnered criticism not only for its anticompetitive market effect, but also
for its ecological effect of strengthening glyphosate resistance in the
environment as a whole. 5 5 Noxious weeds with natural glyphosate-
tolerance, such as ragweed and horsetail, find increased opportunity
commensurate with increased glyphosate use. The weeds serve as
corporate vassals. The single-herbicide strategy not only reinforces the
value of Monsanto's patents, it also threatens biodiversity.156
151 Id. at 1344. Judge Dyk wrote of the mandatory use of Roundup to the exclusion of
competitors' products that "The elimination of such potential competition is not
permissible under the antitrust laws." Id.
s2 Id. at 95 ("Market power would be.. .relevant to the ability of an intellectual property
owner to harm competition through unreasonable conduct in connection with such
roperty.").
3 See ROBIN, supra note 43, at 325.
154 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Cleavenger, J.,
dissenting).
155 See Benbrook, supra note 123 ("Reliance on a single herbicide, glyphosate... has led
to the need to apply more herbicides per acre to achieve the same level of weed
control.").
156 See CHANDRA, supra note 113, at 450, (arguing agricultural biodiversity is diminished
by patent protection for these seeds). "Diverse seeds adapted to diverse ecosystems are




Since Monsanto's patent-protected soybeans have proven to be
hard to limit to the fields of farmers who have contracted with
Monsanto,'5 7 an antitrust claim for Bowman could have focused on the
increasing infeasibility of obtaining seeds that do not contain Monsanto's
patented sequences. Bowman bought commodity seeds from a source not
affiliated with Monsanto, but still he was liable for patent infringement.
An antitrust counterclaim against Monsanto becomes more persuasive as
the availability of seeds that do not contain Monsanto's patented traits
decreases, or even simply on the market realities that have compelled
farmers to plant Monsanto's seeds.' 59
Monsanto's pledge 60 claims to work with farmers in the instance
that their protected genetic sequences infiltrate the fields of farmers who
have not signed the Technology Agreement. But the company's
aggressive litigation belies this policy.' 6 1 Also suspicious is the
establishment of the hotline 1-800-ROUNDUP, a telephone service for
farmers to inform on other farmers who use Monsanto's seeds.' 62 As a
result of strong monetary incentives to take over neighboring farmers'
land, Monsanto can count on an environment of suspicion and panic
amongst soybean growers.163
After Scruggs and Bowman, Monsanto is poised for supreme
control of the soybean market. The commodity seeds Bowman planted for
his second crop were subject to Monsanto's patent protection, despite the
fact that the only notice Monsanto served Bowman with was a letter which
did not differentiate between the two types of seeds. The other side of the
coin is Scruggs, who was liable for infringement despite never signing the
"'See McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291.
158See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011).1 5 9McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291,(Clevenger, J., dissenting) ("Farmers like McFarling have
little choice but to sign the Technology Agreement if they wish to remain competitive in
the soybean market.") Id. at 1301.
I6 Who We Are, Our Pledge, MONSANTO
http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/pages/monsanto-pledge.aspx (last visited Sept. 29,
2012).
161 See ROBIN, supra note 43 at 208.
162 Rick Weiss, Seeds ofDiscontent, WASH. PosT, Feb. 3, 1999.
163 See ROBIN, supra note 43, at 212-13.
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licensing agreement. Soybean farmers may not be able to avoid growing
soybeans that contain Monsanto's patented genes, and once they plant
Monsanto's seeds, they need to go back to Monsanto for the herbicides
that allow the seeds to grow. These circumstances form an illegal genetic
monopoly.
VI. CONCLUSION
For centuries, hunger was a sufficient incentive to agricultural
innovation. Transgenic technologists have successfully persuaded
lawmakers that we now need the lure of wealth to foster the development
of new plant traits. Intellectual property holders deserve protection for
their investments, but only to a point where the public interest is not
harmed. Genetic proprietors have pursued broad control over the fruits of
their innovation. Courts have rewarded their work with a heretofore
unprecedented control over genetic sequences. The U.S. Supreme Court
heard the Bowman case on February 19 th, 2013. Without clear limits to
the rights of patent holders, agricultural competition becomes more one-
sided with each harvest. Heredity becomes subject to corporate
management. The Foucaultian notion of biopower, "the subjugation of
bodies and the control of populations," has broad legal support.164
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'" 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION
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